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JURISDICTION OF THE UTAH SUPREME COURT
The Court has jurisdiction of this federally-certified
question pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(1).
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
As stated in the November 6, 1991 Order of
Certification (R. Vol. Ill, Docket #124) of Judge J. Thomas
Greene of the United States District Court for the District of
Utah, the issues of law certified for determination by this
Court are:
1.

Should the Liability Reform Act of 1986, Utah

Code Ann. §§ 78-27-37, et seq. (1987), be interpreted to permit
the decedent's employer to be named upon a special verdict form
for the purpose of permitting the jury to allocate to it a
portion of the fault which caused or contributed to the death,
notwithstanding that the employer is immune from suit pursuant
to the Workers' Compensation Act, Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-60
(1988)?
2.

Would interpretation of the Liability Reform Act

of 1986, Utah Code Ann. § § 78-27-37, et seq., to permit the
naming of a decedent's employer upon a special verdict form for
the purpose of permitting the jury to allocate to it a portion
of the fault which caused or contributed to the death
contravene Utah Const. Art. XVI, § 5?

-1-

Standard of Review: The above issues are issues of
law, which are reviewed by the Court for correctness.
v. Morgan 788 P.2d 497 (Utah 1989).

Bonham

While Judge Greene

certified these questions, he did not decide them.

However,

United States Magistrate Calvin Gould issued an Order (R. Vol.
II, Docket #99) deciding the first question in appellee's
favor.
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES
- Utah Liability Reform Act, Utah Code Ann.
§§ 78-27-37 et seq.
- The "exclusive remedy" statute of the Workers'
Compensation Act, Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-60.
- Utah Const. Art. XVI, § 5
As provided in Rule 24(a)(6), Utah Rules of Appellate
Procedure, these statutes are set forth in an addendum.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of The Case and Course of Proceedings
Plaintiff Cynthia Gines, on her own behalf and as
guardian ad litem of her minor children, filed this wrongful
death action for damages stemming from the death of her husband
and the children's father, Randy Gines.

Mr. Gines was killed

in an underground coal mine accident on August 9, 1988.
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Mr, Gines was employed by U.S. Fuel Co., the
owner/operator of the underground coal mine at which the death
occurred.

Defendants contend that the employer's conduct

played a role in the death.

While Defendants concede they

cannot join the employer as a party, they desire to have the
jury consider the employer's conduct and allocate to it a
portion of the fault contributing to Mr. Gines' death.
Defendants filed a "Motion In Limine Re: Inclusion of
Employer on Special Verdict" (R. Vol. I Docket #70) to name the
employer on the special verdict form, and to have the jury
apportion its fault along with that of Defendants and
Plaintiffs' decedent, if any.
Defendants' Motion was referred to United States
Magistrate Calvin Gould for decision pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 636. The Magistrate issued his Order denying Defendants'
Motion In Limine (R. Vol. II, Docket #99) on June 25, 1991.
Defendants filed an Objection to the Magistrate's Order (R.
Vol. II, Docket #103) which was heard before Judge Greene on
October 17, 1991.

Judge Greene deferred ruling on Defendants'

objection pending resolution of these issues by the Utah State
Supreme Court.

An Order of Certification issued on November 6,

1991 (R. Vol. Ill, Docket #124).
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Statement of Facts
For purposes of the Motion in Limine below, the
parties agreed to the following statement of facts (R. Vol. II,
Docket #84, p.3) :
1.

Plaintiffs' decedent, an employee of U. S. Fuel,

was killed in a mining accident on August 9, 1988.
2.

The fatal accident involved a roof-bolting

machine manufactured by defendants.
3.

Plaintiffs brought this wrongful death action

against defendants, alleging products liability and negligence.
4.

The employer of plaintiffs1 decedent, U. S. Fuel,

is not a party to this action due to the statutory immunity
conferred on employers by Utah's workers' compensation statutes.
5.

Evidence has been adduced that U. S. Fuel may

share some fault or negligence in this fatal accident.
SUMMARY OF APPELLANTS' ARGUMENT
The fundamental purpose of the Liability Reform Act
would be defeated by the result urged by plaintiff.
would be saddled with the fault of non-parties.

Parties

This Court

should rule, as have other jurisdictions with similar
comparative negligence statutes, that the jury can allocate
fault to an employer under the Liability Reform Act.
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Such a ruling would not contravene Utah's Workers'
Compensation Act or Art. XVI § 5 of the Utah Constitutution.
ARGUMENT
I.

THE JURY SHOULD BE ALLOWED TO WEIGH THE FAULT OF
THE EMPLOYER IN A TORT ACTION.

This wrongful death action is governed by Utah's
Liability Reform Act, Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-37 through 43.
This legislation, enacted in 1986, abolished joint and several
liability in favor of "pure" comparative negligence, wherein a
defendant's liability is limited to his percentage of fault.
The issue herein is whether, under the Liability
Reform Act, the jury may allocate fault only to named parties,
or whether non-party employers may be allocated fault as well.
All references are to Utah Code Annotated, unless
otherwise noted.
A.

Excluding the Employer from the Special Verdict
Defeats the Purpose of the Liability Reform Act.

The intent of Utah's Liability Reform Act is readily
evinced from its language:
[N]o defendant is liable to any person
seeking recovery for any amount in excess of
the proportion of fault attributable to that
defendant.
§ 78-27-38.
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Similarly, § 78-27-40 provides that:
. . . the maximum amount for which a
defendant may be liable to any person
seeking recovery is that percentage or
proportion of the damages equivalent to the
percentage or proportion of fault attributed
to that defendant.
Plainly, the legislature's purpose in enacting the
Liability Reform Act was to correct the perceived inequity of
the doctrine of joint and several liability under the
Comparative Negligence Act.

That statutory framework was

replaced by one in which each defendant answered for his own
fault, and not that of others.
To accomplish its stated purpose of apportioning
liability upon fault, the Liability Reform Act provides for
joinder of parties who "may have caused or contributed to the
injury or damage."

§ 78-27-41.

In this manner, all those who

contributed to the injury will be joined for a "global"
allocation of fault.

However, a problem arises when a person

at fault is immune.

The Act defines "defendant" as "any person

not immune from suit . . . ."

§ 78-27-37(1).

Under this

definition, an employer whose negligence contributed to the
employee's accident may not be joined as a defendant.
Plaintiff will undoubtedly argue that this language precludes
the jury's determination of an employer's fault.

However, that

result does not follow from the language cited.

Moreover, such
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a result would contravene the fundamental purpose of the
Liability Reform Act.
The restriction on joinder of immune persons does not
preclude a jury's weighing of the fault of such persons. The
jury considers those persons to allocate their fault, not to
impose liability.

Immunity would be preserved, as would the

Act *s purpose of limiting a defendant's liability to his own
fault.

By contrast, if a jury were prevented from allocating

the fault of a negligent but immune actor, the intent of the
Act would be defeated.

The fault of the immune actor would be

"spread" among the named parties.

The jury would have no

choice but to distribute between parties the fault of
non-parties.

A party would be liable for the fault of others,

a result flatly contrary to the Act's purpose and language.
Plaintiff argues that apportionment to an immune
non-party violates the language of § 78-27-39, which provides
for a special verdict determining the percentage of fault
attributable "to each person seeking recovery and to each
defendant."

Plaintiff's argument is that this language

"implies" the negative, i.e., that an allocation to a non-party
is prohibited by the statutory language.

An identical argument

was rejected by the Idaho Supreme Court in Pocatello Ind. Park
Co. v. Steel West, Ind. 621 P.2d 399 (Idaho 1980).
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The

plaintiff therein argued that negligence could not be allocated
to non-parties because Idaho's comparative negligence statute,
§ 6-802 I.e., authorized the jury to allocate negligence "to
each party."

The Idaho Supreme Court rejected that argument:

While the statute requires that parties be
included in this special verdict, it does
not state that only parties shall be
included. Minnesota's comparative
negligence statute, Minn. Stat. § 604.01, is
identical to ours and the Minnesota Supreme
Court has also concluded that non-parties
may be included in the special verdict.
Lines v. Ryan 272 N.W.2d 896 (Minn. 1978).
Id. at 403 n.4. (Court's emphasis)
Plaintiff's focus on isolated language in the
Liability Reform Act is inconsistent with rules of statutory
construction.

A statute should be interpreted to effectuate

its purpose, even if that application doesn't comport with its
literal language:
"[0]ne of the fundamental rules of statutory
construction is that the statute should be looked
at as a whole and in light of the general purpose
it was intended to serve; and should be so
interpreted and applied so as to accomplish that
objective. In order to give the statute the full
implementation which will fulfill its purpose,
reason and intention sometimes prevail over
technically applied literalness".
Andrus v. Allred, 404 P.2d 972, 974 (Utah, 1965) (citations
omitted).
This Court should rule that a jury may weigh the fault
of an immune employer, though not a party.
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This result does

not contravene the language of the Act, and preserves its
purpose.

As argued below, other jurisdictions have reached

such a result.

B.

The Utah Workers' Compensation Act Does not
Prohibit the Jury From Weighing the Fault of the
Employer.

Plaintiff argued in United States District Court that
allocation to an employer is impossible because "the employer
can have no 'fault1" (R. Vol. II, Docket #84, p. 4). This is
true in the context of workers' compensation, a no-fault system
in which an injured employee is entitled to benefits
independent of fault.

However, that analysis does not apply to

a tort action, the purpose of which is to allocate fault.
The jury's apportionment of an employer's fault does
not contravene the language of the "exclusive remedy" statute
of the Workers' Compensation Act. § 35-1-60 provides in part
that:
the liabilities of the employer imposed by this
act shall be in place of any and all other
civil liability whatsoever, at common law, or
otherwise . . . and no action at law may be
maintained against an employer . . . based on
any accident, injury or death of an employee,
(emphasis added)
The result urged by defendants would not violate any provision
of this "exclusive remedy" statute.
-9-

No civil liability would

be assessed against the employer, and the employer would not be
joined in any action.
To support her argument that an employer can have no
"fault" under the Workers' Compensation Act, plaintiff relies
on Curtis v. Harmon Electronic, Inc., 552 P.2d 117 (Utah 1976)
and Phillips v. Union Pacific R.R.Co. 614 P.2d 153 (Utah 1980)
(R. Vol. II, Docket #84, p. 6 et seq.).

These Utah authorities

are inapposite, cases in which defendant sought to join
plaintiff's employer for contribution purposes.

The Utah

Supreme Court rejected such claims because an employer's only
liability is for worker's compensation.

This distinction is

missed by plaintiff: unlike the defendants in Curtis and
Phillips, defendants herein do not seek to join the employer or
impose liability upon the employer.

Defendant seeks only to

have the employer's fault allocated.
Plaintiff blurs the concepts of fault and liability,
ignoring the bright line between the two: fault can be
allocated without imposing liability.

This preserves the

employer's immunity and preserves the purpose of the Liability
Reform Act.

Kansas and Idaho have achieved both goals, as

argued below.
Plaintiff also relies on Professor Larsen's treatise
The Law of Workmens' Compensation
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(R. Vol. II, Docket #84, p.

4 et seq.).

Of paramount concern to Professor Larsen is that

employers be shielded from tort liability under all
circumstances.

Allowing a jury to allocate fault to an

employer does not violate that principle of worker's
compsnation law.

An employer's liability is still limited to

worker's compensation benefits; the employer remains immune in
tort.
In sum, the shield afforded employers by Utah's
Workers Compensation Act would not be compromised if this Court
were to adopt defendants' interpretation of the Liability
Reform Act.

C.

The Jury's Allocation of Fault to an Employer
Does Not Contravene Art. XVI, § 5 of the Utah
Constitution.

The second question certified by the United States
District Court is whether, in a wrongful death action such as
this, allocation of fault to an employer violates Utah Const.
Art. XVI, § 5.
Plaintiff did not make this argument in her pleadings
to the United States District Court.
how to respond.

Defendants are uncertain

Perhaps defendants can best address this point
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in their Reply Brief, after plaintiff has made known her
argument.

Nevertheless, defendants will briefly address this

point below.
Utah Const. Art. XVI, § 5 provides:
The right of action to recover damages for
injuries resulting in death shall never be
abrogated, and the amount recoverable shall not
be subject to any statutory limitation, except
in cases where compensation for injuries
resulting in death is provided for by law.
Defendants make no argument that the Liability Reform
Act abrogates the right of action for wrongful death, or
creates a statutory limitation on the amount recoverable
therein.

Defendants do not challenge plaintiff's standing to

bring this action, or claim any "cap" to her recovery.

Thus,

defendants1 position would not seem to violate the plain
language of Utah Const. Art. XVI, § 5.
Defendants' interpretation of the Liability Reform Act
focuses on the abolition of joint and several liability, and
the restiction of liability to proportionate fault.

This

statutory framework for imposing liability is independent of
Utah's wrongful death statutes, U.C.A. §§ 78-11-6 and 78-11-7.
Admittedly, under the result urged by defendants, a plaintiff
in a wrongful death action can only recover from a defendant
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its proportionate share of liability.

This is neither an

abrogation of the right of action, nor a limitation on the
amount recoverable.
The distinction between abrogating the right of action
and regulating the right of action was noted by this Court in
Berry ex rel. Berry v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 717 P.2d 670 (Utah
1985).

In Berry, this Court held the Utah Product Liability

Act unconstitutional because it violated Utah Const. Art. XVI,
§ 5 (as well as the "open courts" clause, Utah Const. Art. I,
§ 11). Under certain circumstances, the Product Liability Act
eliminated a wrongful death action before it arose, effectively
nullifying the wrongful death statutes.

Because the

Legislature was not empowered to nullify the wrongful death
statutes, either directly or indirectly, the Product Liability
Act contravened Art. XVI, § 5.

However, the Berry Court noted

that the Legislature was empowered to regulate the enforcement
of wrongful death actions, and the defenses available therein:
Clearly, the Legislature may enact reasonable
procedures for the enforcement of wrongful
death actions and may provide for reasonable
defenses that are not inconsistent with the
fundamental nature of the wrongful death action
itself.
Id. at 685.
The allocation of fault to an employer arises from the
Liability Reform Act's abolition of joint and severable
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liability, not from any abrogation of the right of action for
wrongful death.

The Liability Reform Act provides that a

wrongful death defendant must answer only for his fault, and
not that of others.

This is a reasonable defense, not

inconsistent with the fundamental nature of the wrongful death
action, and thus does not violate Utah Const. Art. XVI, § 5.

II.

OTHER JURISDICTIONS HOLD THAT NON-PARTIES (INCLUDING
NON-PARTY EMPLOYERS) MUST BE INCLUDED ON THE SPECIAL
VERDICT.
Twelve years before Utah enacted its Liability Reform

Act, the Kansas legislature passed a similar act abolishing
joint and several liability and implementing "pure" comparative
negligence.

The 1974 Kansas Comparative Negligence Act,

K.S.A. § 60-258a, mirrors Utah's Liability Reform Act.
K.S.A. § 60-258a(b) provides that a jury through special
verdict shall determine "the percentage of negligence
attributable to each of the parties" and section (c) of the
Kansas statute provides that upon motion "any other person
whose causal negligence is claimed to have contributed to such
death, personal injury, or property damage shall be joined as
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an additional party to the action".

These two sections

correspond to § 78-27-39 and 78-27-41 of the Liability Reform
Act, respectively.
In Brown v. Keill, 580 P.2d 867 (Kansas 1978), the
Kansas Supreme Court decided whether the Kansas Comparative
Negligence Act allowed a jury to allocate fault to
non-parties.

Brown was an automobile accident case in which

the trial court allocated fault as follows:
Plaintiff
Defendant
Non-party

0%
10%
90%
100%

Damages were set at $5,423.

Under the pure comparative

negligence of K.S.A. § 60-258a, plaintiff was awarded judgment
against defendant for $542, or 10% of total damages.
On appeal, the plaintiff in Brown argued that "Nowhere
in the act does it state that persons who are not parties to
the action are to have any impact on the ultimate judgment to
be entered . . . .

Therefore, it is incumbent upon a defendant

to join such additional parties as he may deem necessary or
advisable to determine their fault".

Ijd. at 874.

In rejecting

this argument, and affirming the trial court, the Kansas
Supreme Court reasoned that failure to allocate to non-parties
was inconsistent with legislative intent because it saddled
named parties with the fault of non-parties:
-15-

It appears after considering the intent and
purpose of the entire statute that such a
party's fault should be considered in each
case to determine the other defendant's
percentage of fault and liability, if any.
The proportionate liability of the other
parties to the action under
K.S.A. § 60-258a(d) should not be increased
merely because a party joined under
subsection (c) has a valid defense to
plaintiff's claim, other than lack of
negligence. . . . [W]e conclude the intent
and purpose of the legislature in adopting
K.S.A. § 60-258a was to impose individual
liability for damages based on the
proportionate fault of all parties to the
occurrence which gave rise to the injuries
and damages, even though one or more parties
cannot be joined formally as a litigant or
be held legally responsible for his or her
proportionate fault.
Id. at 876.
The Tenth Circuit Court acknowledged the propriety of
allocation to non-parties in Hardin v. Manitowoc-Forsythe
Corp., 691 F.2d 449 (10th Cir. 1982).

Hardin was a products

liability action in which the jury allocated fault as follows:
Plaintiff
Defendant
Defendant
Non-Party
Non-Party
Non-Party

20%
#1
#2
#1
#2
#3

13.5%

0%
4 5%

9%
12.5%
100%

Damages were $150,000, and plaintiff was awarded judgment
against Defendant #1 for $20,250, or 13.5% of total damages.
On appeal in Hardin, plaintiff argued it was improper
to compare the fault of non-parties with defendants in a
-16-

products liability case.

In rejecting that argument, the Tenth

Circuit Court interpreted K.S.A. § 258a and held as follows:
The legislative intent behind § 258a is to
ensure that all claims arising out of a
tortious act are fully litigated in a single
action. Eurich v. Alkire, 224 Kan. 236, 579
P.2d 1207 (1978). The joinder provision of
§ 258a(c) allows a defendant to force a
comparison of fault with third parties, but
formal joinder is not a necessary
prerequisite to comparing the fault of
another. Kennedy v. City of Sawyer, 228
Kan. 439, 460, 618 P.2d 788, 803 (1980);
Brown v. Keill, 224 Kan. 195, 206-7,
580 P.2d 867, 875-6 (1978). Thus, the
Kansas courts have allowed comparison of the
fault of phantom parties in products
liability cases. Forsythe v. Coats Co.,
Inc., 230 Kan. 553, 639 P.2d 443 (1982);
Lester v. Magic Chef, Inc., 230 Kan. 643,
641 P.2d 353 (1982), as well as in
negligence cases. Brown v. Kiell, 224 Kan.
195, 580 P.2d, 867 (1978). We therefore
reject plaintiffs contention that the fault
of phantom parties cannot be compared under
Kansas law.
Id. at 454.
One year after its decision in Hardin, the Tenth
Circuit Court held that employers were among the class of
non-parties whose fault should be allocated by the jury.
Prince v. Leesona Corp., Inc., 720 F.2d 1166 (10th Cir. 1983)
was a products liability action in which the jury allocated
fault as follows:
Plaintiff
Defendant
Non-Party (plaintiff's
employer)
-17-

35%
5%
60%
100%

Damages were $200,000, and judgment was assessed against the
defendant manufacturer for $10,000, or 5% of total damages.
On appeal, the plaintiff in Prince challenged the
grounds on which fault had been allocated to her non-party
employer.

In affirming the jury's verdict, the Tenth Circuit

Court reasoned as follows:
Section 258a(c) of the Kansas Comparative
Negligence Act allows a defendant to force a
comparison of fault with third parties, even
though formal joinder is not required.
Kennedy v. City of Sawyer, 228 Kan. 439, 618
P.2d 788, 803 (1980). This comparison of
fault to phantom parties has been extended
to products liability cases. [citations
omitted] In essence, what Kansas has done
is to let the jury determine the degree to
which each actor has departed from his or
her respective duty and apportion fault
accordingly. As explained in Kennedy, all
types of fault, regardless of degree, are to
be compared with that of defendant whether
the fault is characterized as contributory
negligence, assumption of risk, product
misuse, or unreasonable use. All of these
defenses depend on the reasonableness of
plaintiff's conduct, a negligence
concept. . . . The same general principles
apply to phantom employers.
Id. at 1171.
A final Kansas precedent is Anderson v. National
Carriers, Inc., 695 P.2d 1293 (Kan. App. 1985).

Anderson was a

personal injury case in which the jury allocated fault as
follows:

-18-

Plaintiff
Defendant
Non-Party (plaintiffs
employer)

29%
22%
49%
100%

An issue on appeal was whether the trial court erred in
allowing the jury to weigh the fault of plaintiff's employer as
a phantom defendant.

The Anderson Court affirmed, holding that

the employer was not "joined" as an actual party, but strictly
for comparison purposes:
National Beef was immune from suit under the
exclusive remedy provision of the Workmen's
Compensation Act, [citations omitted]
Therefore, National Beef cannot be made an
actual party to the negligence action or be
held liable for its proportionate fault.
National Beef, however, is a necessary party
for the purpose of considering and
allocating proportionate fault. . . . Under
[K.S.A. § 60-258a(c)], National Beef,
although an immune party, may be joined as a
•phantom party' for comparison purposes.
Id.

at 1298.
Idaho is another jurisdiction which holds that a jury

should apportion the fault of non-party employers in tort
actions.

In Pocatello Industrial Park Co. v. Steel West, Inc.

621 P.2d 399 (Idaho 1980), an employee of Steel West was
injured in a building.
for negligence.

The employee sued the building owner

The trial court allocated 80% of the

negligence to the building owner, and 20% to the employee. On
appeal, the Idaho Supreme Court faced an issue of first
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impression:

whether the negligence of plaintiff's employer,

Steel West, should have been allocated by the trial court.

The

Idaho Supreme Court answered in the affirmative, finding that
practice to be "prevalent" among state courts.
Finally, IIC [Steel West's insurance
carrier] and Steel West were not parties to
the [employee's] action. The trial court
might have felt that it was precluded from
apportioning any negligence to Steel West
due to its status as a non-party. If that
be the case, we think the trial court
erred. The inclusion of non-parties in the
special verdict is apparently a question of
first impression in Idaho, although we have
reviewed other cases in which negligence was
apportioned to a non-party. Tucker v. Union
Oil Co. of California, 100 Idaho 590, 603
P.2d 156 (1979); Jensen v. Shank 99 Idaho
565, 585 P.2d 1276 (1978). In neither case
did we comment on the practice. We now
adopt the rule which was suggested by Tucker
and Jensen and which is clearly the
prevalent practice among state courts. 'It
is established without doubt that, when
apportioning negligence, a jury must have
the opportunity to consider the negligence
of all parties to the transaction, whether
or not they be parties to the lawsuit and
whether or not they can be liable to the
plaintiff or to other tortfeasors either by
operation of law or because of a prior
release.' Connar v. West Shore Equipment
68 Wis. 2d 42, 227 N.W.2d 660, 662 (1975).
id. at 402-3.
In Lasselle v. Special Products Co. 677 P.2d 483
(Idaho 1983), plaintiff was injured while using a posthole
digger.

Plaintiff sued the manufacturer and dealer of the
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equipment.

The dealer settled shortly before trial, and the

trial court refused to include the dealer on the special
verdict.

The Idaho Supreme Court reversed, citing Pocatello

Ind. Park, supra, and holding that ". . . in a negligence
action it is imperative that the jury have the opportunity to
consider the negligence of all the parties to the
transaction."

Id.

at 485.

In Vannoy v. Uniroyal Tire Co., 726 P.2d 648 (Idaho
1985) the Idaho Supreme Court held that a jury should weigh the
fault of non-parties in products liability actions as well:
We have interpreted I.C. § 6-801, the
comparative negligence statute, to require
all negligent actors contributing to the
causation of any accident or injuries to be
listed on the jury verdict, whether or not
they are parties to the action. Lasselle v.
Special Products Co., supra; Pocatello Ind.
Park Co. v. Steel West, Inc., supra. Reason
and consistency in statutory interpretation
dictate that products liability cases based
on strict liability should be treated the
same.
Id. at 654.
The question of whether an employer should be included
on a special verdict was certified to the Oklahoma Supreme
Court by a federal district court in Bode v. Clark Equipment
Co. , 719 P.2d 824 (Okla. 1986).

In Bode, plaintiff was injured

by a forklift his employer had purchased from the United States
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government.

Plaintiff sued the United States, as his employer

was immune.

A federal jury allocated fault as follows:

Plaintiff
Defendant
Non-Party (plaintiff's
employer)

9%
1%
90%
100%

After the verdict, the issue arose as to whether plaintiff was
entitled to recover 1% of his damages from the defendant.

The

federal court certified the question to the Oklahoma Supreme
Court, which answered as follows:
The negligence of the employer must be considered in
determining comparative fault, even if the employer is
immune from common law tort liability because of the
exclusive remedy provided by the Oklahoma Worker's
Compensation law; therefore, the plaintiff is entitled
to collect 1% of his damages from the United States.
Id. at 824. The Bode Court held that recovery was allowed if
the plaintiff's fault is exceeded by the combined fault of the
phantom defendant and the named defendant:
[W]e can find substantial authority to support the
conclusion that the negligence of non-parties or
•ghost tortfeasors' should be considered in assessing
proportionate fault in comparative negligence cases.
Id. at 827.
A distinction should be noted between the Oklahoma
statute in question and the corresponding statute in Utah's
Liability Reform Act.

The relevant Oklahoma statute, 23 O.S.C.

1981 § 13, allows recovery if plaintiff's fault is less than
the combined fault of any "persons" causing such damage, while
-22-

§ 78-27-38 allows recovery if plaintiff's fault is less than
the fault of "any defendant or group of defendants". However,
the Bode Court's holding that non-parties should appear on the
special verdict did not turn solely on this distinction.

The

Court went beyond the statutory language to find "substantial
authority" in case law for its answer to the federally
certified question.
The Utah Supreme Court has not addressed the issue of
whether non-parties, such as immune employers, should appear on
the special verdict.

Although decided before enactment of the

Liability Reform Act, Godesky v. Provo City, 690 P.2d 541 (Utah
1984), may furnish guidance.

In Godesky, an employee of a

roofing company was injured when he touched an electrical wire
at the Monticello Apartments in Provo.

The jury allocated 70%

of the fault to Provo, 20% to Monticello and 10% to plaintiff's
employer.

While the issue was not squarely raised on appeal,

the Utah Supreme Court did expressly approve the jury's
allocation of fault to the immune employer:
This is precisely what the jury did in this case. It
compared the negligence of Provo, Monticello and
[plaintiff's employer] and determined that each
actor's negligence concurred to cause plaintiff's
injury and that [plaintiff's employer's] 10%
negligence did not supercede Provo's 70% negligence as
a matter of fact.
Id. at 544-5.
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CONCLUSION
To accept plaintiff's position would force the jury to
allocate all of the fault to less than all of the actors.
purpose of the Liability Reform Act would be defeated.

The

This

Court should interpret the Act to allow the jury to apportion
fault to an employer.

DATED this

day of April, 1992.
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ADDENDUM
Of

Relevant Statutes:
Utah Liability Reform Act
As used in Sections 78-27-37 through 78-27-43:
(1)

"Defendant" means any person not immune from suit
who is claimed to be liable because of fault to
any person seeking recovery.

(2)

"Fault" means any actionable breach of legal
duty, act, or omission proximately causing or
contributing to injury or damages sustained by
persons seeking recovery, including, but not
limited to, negligence in all its degrees,
contributory negligence, assumption of risk,
strict liability, breach of express or implied
warranty of a product, products liability, and or
misuse, modification or abuse of a product.

(3)

"Person seeking recovery" means any person
seeking damages or reimbursement on its own
behalf, or on behalf of another form whom it is
authorized to act as legal representative.

Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-37 (1986).
The fault of a person seeking recovery shall not alone
bar recovery by that person. He may recover from any
defendant or group of denfendants whose fault exceeds
his own. However, no defendant is liable to any
person seeking recovery for any amount in excess of
the proportion of fault attributable to that defendant.
Utah Code Ann. §

78-27-38 (1986).

The trial court may, and when requested by any party
shall, direct the jury, if any, to find separate
special verdicts determining the total amount of
damages sustained and the percentage or proportion of
fault attributable to each person seeking recovery and
to each defendant.

Utah Code Ann. §

78-27-39 (1986).

Subject to Section 78-27-38, the maximum amount for
which a defendant may be liable to any person seeking
recovery is that percentage or proportion of the
damages equivalent to the percentage or proportion of
fault attributed to that defendant. No defendant is
entitled to contribution from any other person.
Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-40 (1986).
A person seeking recovery, or any defendant who is a
party to the litigation, may join as parties any
defendants who may have caused or contributed to the
injury or damage for which recovery is sought, for the
purpose of having determined their respective
proportions of fault.
Utah Code Ann. §

78-27-41 (1986).

Nothing in Sections 78-27-37 through 78-27-42 affects
or impairs any common law or statutory immunity from
liability, including, but not limited to, governmental
immunity as provided in Cahpter 30, Title 63, and the
exclusive remedy provisions of Chapter 1, Title 35.
Nothing in Sections 78-27-37 through 78-27-42 affects
or impairs any right to indemnity or contribution
arising from statute, contract or agreement.
Utah Code Ann. §

78-27-43 (1986).

"Exclusive Remedy" Provision of Utah Workers' Compensation Act.
The right to recover compensation pursuant to the
provisions of this title for injuries sustained by an employee,
whether resulting in death or not, shall be the exclusive
remedy against the employer and shall be the exclusive remedy
against any officer, agent or employee of the employer and the
liabilities of the employer imposed by this act shall be in

place of any and all other civil liability whatsoever, at
common law or otherwise, to such employee . . . on account of
any accident or injury or death, in any way contracted,
sustained, aggravated or incurred by such employee in the
course of or because of or arising out of his employment, and
no action at law may be maintained against an employer or
against any officer, agent or employee of the employer based
upon any accident, injury or death of an employee.

Utah Code

Ann. § 35-1-60 (1953), as amended.

Utah Const. Art. XVI, S 5
The right of action to recover damages for injuries
resulting in death shall never be abrogated, and the amount
recoverable shall not be subject to any statutory limitation,
except in cases where compensation for injuries resulting in
death is provided for by law.

